




Director of
Central
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031200160002-6

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National Intelligence Daily

Monday
19 March 1979

State Dept. review completed

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
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
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Overnight Reports 19

The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.

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IRAN: Attack on Embassy Possible

US Ambassador Sullivan in Tehran fears that conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty could spark another attack on the US Embassy. He notes that the chaotic situation in Tehran is tailor-made for terrorism and that the Embassy compound would be a dramatic target if the Palestine Liberation Organization wants to demonstrate that it can carry out Yasir Arafat's threat to cause the Middle East to explode. In addition, the leftist Chariks are looking for an opportunity to embarrass the government of Prime Minister Bazargan, and the Ambassador believes that an unpopular cause such as the treaty would enable them to do so with relatively little fear of reaction from the Islamic majority. He says that the Chariks and the PLO could be expected to take a common initiative.

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

CHINA: "De-Maoification" and Chairman Hua

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China's leaders apparently met last month to discuss such ticklish domestic political issues as a reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s, a further reassessment of the role of Mao Zedong, and possibly more changes in the leadership of China's 29 provinces. The Mao issue in particular has received extensive media coverage, which accounts at least in part for the unusually severe criticism of Mao's chosen heir, party Chairman Hua Guofeng.

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Since late February, Chinese media have repeatedly discussed Mao's mistakes and have subordinated his achievements to those of the late Premier Zhou Enlai. One article linking Mao to the discredited Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, who wrought such havoc during the Cultural Revolution, will make it more difficult in the future to isolate Mao from the evils of that period.

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An article early this month was even more harmful to Mao's image. It labeled the 18 years between the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 as "leftist" and therefore excessive and ill-conceived. It argued that economic development was satisfactory until the Great Leap Forward set unrealistic goals and threw China's economic priorities out of line. The article concluded that the "leftist" line of that period was not corrected until the gang was arrested.

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This blanket condemnation goes well beyond previous criticism of Mao. It seems to be setting the stage for an official evaluation of Mao that will praise his rule of 1949-1957 but denounce his subsequent activity. Such an appraisal would be in line with Beijing's admonitions to acknowledge Mao's achievements but to be frank about his shortcomings.

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A less-than-flattering reassessment of Mao has always held the danger of casting doubt on Mao's judgment in selecting Hua Guofeng as his successor. For this reason, Hua has sought to limit discussion of Mao. Aside from the implications for him of "de-Maoification," there recently has been an increasing number of public statements that undercut Hua more directly. The media have attacked those who built up Mao's image to win his trust and used his name to further their own careers and, in one example, to "finally replace" him. Vice Premier Li Xiannian recently noted that some "ambitious" people had "abused" Mao's authority, possibly a reference to Hua's use of an ambiguous statement by Mao as proof that Mao had chosen Hua to succeed him. Hua may be under more direct attack for his selective editing of a recently published volume of Mao's works, and he has been publicly identified with steel production goals now deemed overly ambitious. [REDACTED]

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Hua's status and influence have fallen to a new low, and he might have serious difficulty retaining both the party chairmanship and the premiership. The increasingly negative assessment of Mao's later years leaves Hua especially vulnerable as a symbol of one of Mao's last official acts, the seemingly "capricious" designation of his successor. [REDACTED]

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Lower Officials in Danger

A change in status may also be in the offing for some second-echelon officials. Three province chiefs have publicly confessed their mistakes, and the position of at least one other is shaky. They are among the small group of provincial leaders who remained in place despite the fall of the Gang of Four. They have apparently been under heavy pressure to break sharply with their past and fall in line behind current policies, and they could be prime candidates for replacement. [REDACTED]

High-Level Objections

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There is some evidence that high-level officials have objected to the political activity of recent weeks.

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An editorial in the party's official daily that calls for looking forward and setting aside grudges indicates that some in the leadership are not comfortable with the effort to correct the political record of the past. This effort plainly serves the purposes of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, who has shown unflagging interest in reevaluating the Cultural Revolution and Mao, preventing Hua from building a power base at the expense of his own proteges, and maintaining political pressure on those whose loyalty he suspects. His attempts to air these issues thoroughly at the party meetings last year were rebuffed, but it is a mark of his influence that he could reopen these questions last month in the face of continued opposition and despite the leadership's seeming preoccupation with the Sino-Vietnamese border war.



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
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France

Press reports indicate that the highlight of yesterday's first round of the French cantonal elections was the turnout--a post-1945 record of 65 to 70 percent of the voters for such balloting. The Socialists appear to have jumped to nearly 26 percent of the vote, while the Communists' share dipped somewhat to 18.6 percent; both parties did well in the economically troubled steelmaking areas of northern and eastern France. The center-right coalition that governs at the national level drew some 47 percent of the votes, a typical performance for those parties in the cantonal elections. Runoffs will be held next Sunday in constituencies where no candidate received an absolute majority yesterday. 

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Romania

The US Embassy in Bucharest reports that Romania, which had received perhaps a third of its oil from Iran, has begun an earnest search for additional sources of petroleum. Ministerial-level missions have recently gone to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, and Iraq. The Embassy notes that there is no clear word of any immediate relief for the Romanians but that Foreign Minister Andrei's visit to Iraq may have been the most successful. The Romanian party newspaper last Thursday asserted that Iraq had agreed to collaborate in seeking out and developing petroleum resources. 

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